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Abstract. This paper proposes a new formulation of the Borda rule in order to deal with the 
problem of cloning manipulation. This new Borda voting specification will be named: 
Dynamic Borda Voting (DBV) and it satisfies Arrow's IIA condition. The calculations, 
propositions with proof and explanations are made to show the effectiveness of this 
method. From DBV, the paper presents a method to measure and quantify the magnitude of 
the shock due to change in irrelevant alternatives over a scale moving from 0 to 100. 
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1. Introduction 
s the individual rational making his choices? If so, is that the whole society is 
rational? In an election by ballot, the plurality of votes always indicates the 
wishes of the voters, that is to say that the candidate who obtains this plurality 
is necessarily the one that the voters prefer to his opponents (Borda, 1781). Borda 
(1781) shows that this opinion, is true in the situation where the vote is made 
between only two subjects, but it may be misleading in all the other situations. 
Since the eighteenth century, two voting methods claim to be able to provide 
solutions to this problem of aggregation of individual choices: the main works are 
from Borda (1781) and Condorcet (1785).  
Unfortunately, these works are not faultless and face many criticisms. This 
paper focuses on voting Borda. One of the main criticisms of the Borda rule is that 
it is highly vulnerable to strategic voting. Voting strategically for/against a 
candidate means giving a higher or lower Borda score than the voter’s preference 
ordering would imply (Lehtinen, 2007). According to Black (1958), defending the 
susceptibility of his rule to strategic manipulation, Borda claimed, ‚My scheme is 
intended only for honest men‛. About that, In Borda count a defeated candidate can 
manipulate the election result in his favour in sincere way by introducing a 
candidate which is a clone of him and voters ranked this clone candidate 
immediately below him. In this situation Borda rule is strictly follows but 
manipulation is possible (Islam, Mohajan, & Moolio, 2012). 
Borda rule faces a major constraint. This is Arrow's impossibility theorem. 
Arrow (1963) states that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives, no 
ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals 
into a community-wide ranking while also satisfying a specified set of criteria: 
Universal Domain (UD), Non-Dictatorship (ND), Strict Pareto (SP) and 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) (Arrow, 1963). In fact, although 
Borda's rule satisfies the first 3 conditions, it does not respect IIA one. 
This paper proposes a new formulation of the Borda rule in order to deal with 
the problem of cloning manipulation. This new Borda voting specification will be 
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named: Dynamic Borda Voting (DBV) and it satisfies Arrow's IIA condition. From 
DBV, the paper presents a method to measure and quantify the magnitude of the 
shock due to change in irrelevant alternatives over a scale moving from 0 to 100. 
The DBV opens the way to practical applications. The paper will present as an 
example, its application on the risk aversion behaviour of investors on the stock 
marketdue to exogenous shocks. Modelling this will focus on changes in individual 
stock portfolio selections and their influence on the overall market situation. 
 
2. Related literature 
One of the best known and most important results of social choice theory is the 
theorem of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) which states that the only 
rules of ‚non-manipulable‛ collective choice by agents are dictatorial rules (Béhue, 
Favardin, & Lepelley, 2009). In other words, any rule of collective choice that is 
somewhat democratic comes up against the following difficulty: there are 
situations in which an agent (or a coalition of agents) is induced to express a non-
sincere preference in order to obtain a result which he prefers to the one he would 
get with a sincere strategy (Béhue, Favardin, & Lepelley, 2009). 
According to Satterthwaite (1975) almost every participant in the formal 
deliberations of a commission realizes that situations may occur where he can 
manipulate the outcome of the commission’s vote by misrepresenting his 
preferences. For example, a voter in choosing among a Democrat, a Republican, 
and a minor party candidate may decide to follow the ‚sophisticated strategy‛ of 
voting for his second choice, the Democrat, instead of his ‚sincere strategy‛ of 
voting for his first choice, the minor party candidate, because he thinks that a vote 
for the minor party candidate would be a wasted vote on a hopeless cause. 
Satterthwaite (1975) investigates if a committee can eliminate use of sophisticated 
strategies among its members by constructing a voting procedure that is ‚strategy-
proof‛ in the sense that under it, no committee member will ever have an incentive 
to use a sophisticated strategy. He found that every strategy-proof voting procedure 
is dictatorial (Satterthwaite, 1975).  
Voting paradoxes are numerous. Lepelley, Moyouwou & Smaoui (2017) study 
scoring elimination rules (SER). SER gives points to candidates according to their 
rank in voters’ preference orders and eliminates those with the lowest number of 
points, constitute an important class of voting rules. This class of rules, that 
includes some famous voting methods such as Plurality Runoff or Coombs Rule, 
suffers from a severe pathology known as monotonicity paradox or monotonicity 
failure, that is, getting more points from voters can make a candidate a loser and 
getting fewer points can make a candidate a winner (Lepelley, Moyouwou & 
Smaoui, 2017). Focusing on the profiles that create the strict and the strong Borda 
paradoxes Diss & Tlidi (2016) provide an organized knowledge of the conditions 
for a profile to show or to never show Borda’s paradox. The framework they use 
allows them to determine the minimum number of voters needed for a profile to 
show either the strong or the strict Borda paradoxes when the differences between 
candidates and the weighted scoring rule are already determined. It also allows 
them to give the differences between candidates in the pairwise election outcomes 
required for a profile to never exhibit one of the two paradoxes for a given 
weighted scoring rule and a fixed number of voters. Finally, they are able to 
describe what range of weighted scoring rules could possibly accompany a given 
number of voters and specified differences between candidates in the pairwise 
election outcomes in order for a profile to never exhibit one of the two paradoxes. 
Saari & McIntee (2013) work on pairwise and positional election outcomes. 
According to them, while it has been known since the eighteenth century that the 
Borda and Condorcet winners need not agree, it had not been known, for instance, 
in which settings the Condorcet and plurality winners can disagree, or must agree. 
These relationships are based on an easily used method that connects pairwise 
tallies with admissible positional outcomes (Saari & McIntee, 2013). 
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Another important issue of voting is Arrow’s Impossibility paradox. By the 
way, Barbie, Puppe & Tasnádi (2006) characterize the preference domains on 
which the Borda count satisfies Arrow’s ‚Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA)‛ condition. According to them, these domains are obtained by fixing one 
preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (Condorcet cycles). 
Therefore, the Borda count is ‘’non-manipulable’’ on a broader class of domains 
when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules (Barbie, Puppe & 
Tasnádi , 2006). On the other hand, they also prove that the rich domains on which 
the Borda count is ‘’non-manipulable’’ for all possible tie-breaking rules are again 
the cyclic permutation domains. Ever since their work, the two most important 
results of social choice theory, the impossibility theorems of Arrow and Gibbard-
Satterthwaite (see Barbie, Puppe, & Tasnádi, 2006), have led to a steady search for 
possibility results on restricted domains. 
The common method is to fix an appropriate set of admissible preferences, and 
to determine which social welfare functions satisfy Arrow’s conditions. This is 
done considering that social choice functions are ‚non-manipulable‛, on that 
preference domain. Another view on the question is presented by Dasgupta & 
Maskin (2003) based on Maskin (1995) work. They consider specific preference 
aggregation rules such as Borda count, and ask on what domains these rules satisfy 
desirable conditions in the spirit of Arrow’s conditions.  
 
3. Dynamic Borda Voting (DBV) and IIA Arrow’s condition 
3.1. Simple Borda votingand Arrow’s IIA presentation 
3.1.1. Theoretical presentation 
Let’s adopt Borda Voting presentation in (Islam, Mohajan, & Moolio, 2012). 
Let M= {1, 2, … m} be the set of individual voters, and let N= {x, y, …, z} be the 
finite set of alternatives where Card(M) = m and Card(N) = n.  
Each voter has to rank the candidates in his preference order and then, we 
proceed to the count of the number of times each candidate is ranked first. At the 
end, the candidate who receives a relative majority is elected. 
If x is strictly preferred to y we write xPy and so on. If x is related to y, the binary 
relations according to Arrow (1963) is as follows: 
 
Reflexivity: ∀x ∈N; xRx. 
Completeness: ∀x, y ∈N&x ≠ y ⇒xRy or yRx. 
Transitivity: ∀x, y, z∈Nif, xRy &yRz ⇒xRz. 
Anti-symmetry: ∀x, y ∈ Nif , xRy &yRx ⇒x = y . 
Asymmetry: ∀x, y ∈ N, such that xRy ⇒ ~ (yRx). 
 
According to Arrow (1963), the social welfare function should satisfy 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. It says that if we’re trying to figure out 
whether society prefers x to y, what people think of z shouldn’t matter.  
3.1.2. Arithmetical Calculations 
Let us assume that there are 4 voters and 4 alternatives x, y, z and t and the 
preference profile be as follows:  
 
Voter 1: 𝑥𝑃𝑦𝑃𝑧𝑃𝑡 / Voter 2: 𝑥𝑃𝑦𝑃𝑧𝑃𝑡   
Voter 3: 𝑦𝑃𝑥𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑧 /𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 4: 𝑦𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑥𝑃𝑧  
 
In the social preferences matrix, we have for the 1st profile(𝑅1
𝑁):  
 
With 𝑖𝑖  representing voter ii∈ [1,4]. Card(N) = 4 and n-1 = 3.  
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Let’s note Borda score for x: 𝐵𝑥  Therefore, Borda count for the different 
alternatives will be as follows: 
 
For x: 𝐵𝑥 = 3 × 2 + 2 × 1 + 1 × 1 +  0 × 0 = 9  
For y: 𝐵𝑦 = 3 × 2 + 2 × 2 + 1 × 0 +  0 × 0 = 10  
For z: 𝐵𝑧 = 3 × 0 + 2 × 0 + 1 × 2 +  0 × 2 = 2  
For t: 𝐵𝑡 = 3 × 0 + 2 × 1 + 1 × 1 +  0 × 2 = 3  
 
Here y gets the highest marks that is 𝐵𝑦 = 10, so y wins. The social preference 
order is(𝑆1):𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑧                . 
3.1.3. The problem 
According to Arrow (1963), there is no social welfare rule that satisfies the all 4 
impossibility theorem conditions. Borda rule respect the 3 first Arrow’s conditions, 
but doesn’t satisfies the last one that is IIA.  
Proof:  
Let’s consider the same example, but let’s assume in respect to IIA, that some 
voters(𝑖1 , 𝑖2 , 𝑖4) change their preferences (Satterthwaite, 1975), but keep the same 
first choice. 
 
Voter 1: 𝑥𝑃𝑧𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑦/ Voter 2: 𝑥𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑧𝑃𝑦   / 
Voter 3: 𝑦𝑃𝑥𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑧 / 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 4: 𝑦𝑃𝑥𝑃𝑧𝑃𝑡 
 
The 2nd profile matrix of social preference(𝑅2
𝑁)will be as follow: 
 
Borda count for the different alternatives will be as follows: 
 
For x: 𝐵 𝑥 = 3 × 2 + 2 × 2 + 1 × 0 +  0 × 0 = 10  
For y: 𝐵 𝑦 = 3 × 2 + 2 × 0 + 1 × 0 +  0 × 2 = 6  
For z: 𝐵 𝑧 = 3 × 0 + 2 × 1 + 1 × 2 +  0 × 1 = 4  
For t: 𝐵 𝑡 = 3 × 0 + 2 × 1 + 1 × 2 +  0 × 1 = 4  
 
Here x gets the highest marks that is 𝐵 𝑥 = 10, so x wins instead of y.  
The social preference order(𝑆2) in (𝑅2
𝑁) is: 𝑥,𝑦, (𝑡, 𝑧                  )≠𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑧                 in (𝑅1
𝑁) 
Conclusion: Borda voting does not respect IIA.  
 
3.2. Dynamic Borda Voting (DBV): A solution? 
Now let’s bring some adjustments to the Borda rule. The DBV consist on 
computing (in the 1st profile 𝑅𝑘
𝑁) weight linked to Borda winner through dynamic 
steps, and used them to determine (in the 2nd profile 𝑅𝑙
𝑁) the social preferences after 
changes in individual preferences.  
Statement: 
 
∀ 𝑥,…𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀  𝑆𝑘 ≠  𝑆𝑙 ,   
∃  𝐵 𝑁𝜔 = 𝑓(𝐵𝑥𝜔 ,… ,𝐵𝑦𝜔 ,𝐵𝑧𝜔 ) 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑠  𝑆
𝑘 =  𝑆𝑙  
 
The objective is to find from the𝐵𝑥𝜔  the 𝐵
 
𝑁𝜔  that, respect:  𝑆
𝑘 = (𝑆𝑙); 
𝐵𝑥𝜔  follows a geometrical progression: 𝐵𝑥𝑗 = 𝐵𝑥0 × (𝑛 − 1)
𝑗𝑥−1;  
j is the level of dynamic floor. 
So that: lim(𝑛 ,𝑗 )→∞ 𝐵𝑥𝑗 = 𝐵𝑥0 × (𝑛 − 1)
𝑗𝑥−1 = ∞;   
If Card(M) = m𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑚] 
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𝐵𝑁𝑖  are computed according to an order of entry in a floor chain. The order 
considered is the  𝑆𝑘  one.  
All the 𝐵𝑥𝜔  obtained from 𝑅𝑘
𝑁 are used to compute the 𝐵 𝑁𝜔  in 𝑅𝑙
𝑁 . 
With 𝑘 < 𝑙. 
Then, 𝐵 𝑁𝜔 = 𝐵
 
𝑁 × 𝐵𝑁𝜔  
3.2.1. Arithmetical Calculations 
Let’s consider the same above example. There are 4 voters and 4 alternatives x, 
y, z and t and the preference profile be as follows:  
In 𝑅𝑘=1
𝑁 , 
 
 
Using the simple Borda Voting, we demonstrated that: The social preference 
order(𝑆2) in (𝑅2
𝑁) is: 𝑥,𝑦, (𝑡, 𝑧                  )≠𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑧                 in (𝑅1
𝑁) 𝑆1 ≠  𝑆2 . 
 
Now let’s find the 𝐵𝑁𝜔 : 𝐵𝑥𝜔 ,𝐵𝑦𝜔 ,𝐵𝑧𝜔 &𝐵𝑡𝜔  
Number of floor is Card (N) = 4. 
 
Order of entrance in floor2: 𝑆1 :𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑧                 
𝐵𝑦 = 𝐵𝑦0 = 10; 𝐵𝑥 = 𝐵𝑥0 = 9;𝐵𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡0 = 3&𝐵𝑧 = 𝐵𝑧0 = 2. 
 
i. First Floor: 𝑗𝑦 = 1. 
According to  𝑆1 , the individual entering in this floor is y.  
There for, 
 
𝐵𝑦1 = 𝐵𝑦0 × (𝑛 − 1)
1−1 = 10 × (4 − 1)0 = 10 
 
In all cases, 𝐵𝑁 = 𝐵𝑁0 = 𝐵𝑁1 . 
 
ii. Second Floor: 𝑗𝑦 = 2; 𝑗𝑥 = 1. 
According to  𝑆1 , the individual entering in this floor is x.  
 
𝐵𝑦2 = 𝐵𝑦0 × (𝑛 − 1)
2−1 = 10 × (4 − 1)1 = 30 
𝐵𝑥1 = 𝐵𝑥0 × (𝑛 − 1)
1−1 = 9 × (4 − 1)0 = 9 
 
This is what happen in the matrix for 𝑗𝑦 = 2; 𝑗𝑥 = 1 
 
iii. Third Floor: 𝑗𝑦 = 3; 𝑗𝑥 = 2; 𝑗𝑡 = 1. 
According to  𝑆1 , the individual entering in this floor is t.  
 
𝐵𝑦3 = 𝐵𝑦0 × (𝑛 − 1)
3−1 = 10 × (4 − 1)2 = 90 
𝐵𝑥2 = 𝐵𝑥0 × (𝑛 − 1)
2−1 = 9 × (4 − 1)1 = 27 
𝐵𝑡1 = 𝐵𝑡0 × (𝑛 − 1)
1−1 = 3 × (4 − 1)0 = 3 
 
 
2 In the event of a tie, choose the Condorcet winner. 
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This is what happen in the matrix for 𝑗𝑦 = 3; 𝑗𝑥 = 2; 𝑗𝑡 = 1 
 
 
vi. Last Floor: 𝑗𝑦 = 4; 𝑗𝑥 = 3; 𝑗𝑡 = 2; 𝑗𝑧 = 1. 
According to  𝑆1 , the individual entering in this floor is z.  
This is what happen in the matrix for 𝑗𝑦 = 4; 𝑗𝑥 = 3; 𝑗𝑡 = 2; 𝑗𝑧 = 1. 
 
 
𝐵𝑦4 = 𝐵𝑦0 × (𝑛 − 1)
4−1 = 10 × (4 − 1)3 = 270 
𝐵𝑥3 = 𝐵𝑥0 × (𝑛 − 1)
3−1 = 9 × (4 − 1)2 = 81 
𝐵𝑡2 = 𝐵𝑡0 × (𝑛 − 1)
2−1 = 3 × (4 − 1)1 = 9 
𝐵𝑧1 = 𝐵𝑧0 × (𝑛 − 1)
1−1 = 2 × (4 − 1)0 = 2 
 
As we are in the last floor, the 𝐵𝑁𝜔 are:  𝐵𝑥𝜔 = 81,  𝐵𝑦𝜔 = 270,   𝐵𝑧𝜔 =
2  &  𝐵𝑡𝜔 = 9. 
Now let’s derived the 𝐵 𝑁𝜔 : 𝐵 𝑥𝜔 ,𝐵 𝑦𝜔 ,𝐵 𝑧𝜔 &𝐵 𝑡𝜔  
They are as: 𝐵 𝑁𝜔 = 𝐵
 
𝑁 × 𝐵𝑁𝜔  
We already have the 𝐵 𝑁. They are Borda points of different alternatives in 𝑅2
𝑁 . 
Previously, we have demonstrated that in 𝑅2
𝑁 , the Borda winner is not the same 
as in 𝑅1
𝑁due to change in irrelevant alternatives. That led to  𝑆1 ≠  𝑆2 . 
Now, let’s consider the same changes in the irrelevant alternatives. 
 
𝐵 𝑥 = 10, 𝐵 𝑦 = 6, 𝐵 𝑧 = 4, &𝐵 𝑡 = 4. 
 
Let’s consider our weights: 
 
𝐵 𝑥𝜔 = 𝐵
 
𝑥 × 𝐵𝑥𝜔 = 10 × 81 = 810 
𝐵 𝑦𝜔 = 𝐵
 
𝑦 × 𝐵𝑦𝜔 = 6 × 270 = 1620 
𝐵 𝑧𝜔 = 𝐵
 
𝑧 × 𝐵𝑧𝜔 = 4 × 2 = 6 
𝐵 𝑡𝜔 = 𝐵
 
𝑡 × 𝐵𝑡𝜔 = 4 × 9 = 36;     
 
In the matrix: 
 
 
There for,  
 
𝐵 𝑦𝜔 > 𝐵
 
𝑥𝜔 > 𝐵
 
𝑡𝜔 > 𝐵
 
𝑧𝜔𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑧                 in 𝑅2
𝑁 𝑆1 =  𝑆2 . Q.E.D. 
 
4. DBV and cloning manipulation 
According to Islam, Mohajan & Moolio (2012), in Borda count a defeated 
candidate can manipulate the election result in his favour in sincere way by 
introducing a candidate which is a clone of him and voters ranked this clone 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
JEB, 4(3), D.R. Dombou, p.234-243. 
240 
candidate immediately below him. In this situation Borda rule is strictly follows 
but manipulation is possible. Giving to them, the possibility of manipulation of the 
result of an election through the misrepresentation of preferences was considered 
neither by Borda nor by Condorcet. What about Dynamic Borda Voting? 
 
4.1. The problem 
Let us assume that there are 17 voters of three types and three alternatives x, y, 
z and the preference profile be as follows (Islam, Mohajan, & Moolio, 2012):  
 
Type 1: xPyPz by 8 voters, 
Type 2: yPzPx by 5 voters, 
Type 3: zPxPy by 4 voters. 
 
Borda count in this profile be as follows: 
 
For x: 𝐵𝑥 = 8 × 2 + 5 × 0 + 4 × 1 =  20 marks, 
For y: 𝐵𝑦 = 8 × 1 + 5 × 2 + 4 × 0 =  18 marks, 
For z: 𝐵𝑧 = 8 × 0 + 5 × 1 + 4 × 2 =  13 marks. 
 
Islam Mohajan & Moolio (2012) modify the above example by adding two 
alternatives u and v. Making preference profile being as follows: 
 
Type 1: xPyPzPuPv by 8 voters, 
Type 2: yPzPxPuPv by 5 voters,  
Type 3: zPxPyPuPv by 4 voters. 
 
Now Borda counts in 𝑅1
𝑁 would be as follows: 
 
For x: 𝐵𝑥 = 8 × 4 + 5 × 2 + 4 × 3 =  54 marks, 
For y: 𝐵𝑦 = 8 × 3 + 5 × 4 + 4 × 2 =  52 marks, 
For z: 𝐵𝑧 = 8 × 2 + 5 × 3 + 4 × 4 =  47 marks, 
For u: 𝐵𝒖 = 8 × 1 + 5 × 1 + 4 × 1 =  17 marks, 
For v: 𝐵𝒗 = 8 × 0 + 5 × 0 + 4 × 0 =  0 mark. 
 
Here, x wins again. Type-3 voters have realized that x would win in theelection 
then they would have change their preference profile as:  
Type 3: zPyPuPvPx by 4 voters, so that the Borda counts in 𝑅2
𝑁 would be: 
 
For x: 𝐵 𝑥 = 8 × 4 + 5 × 2 + 4 × 0 = 42marks, 
For y: 𝐵 𝑦 = 8 × 3 + 5 × 4 + 4 × 3 =  56marks, 
For z: 𝐵 𝑧 = 8 × 2 + 5 × 3 + 4 × 4 =  47marks, 
For u: 𝐵 𝑢 = 8 × 1 + 5 × 1 + 4 × 2 =  21marks, 
For v: 𝐵 𝑣 = 8 × 0 + 5 × 0 + 4 × 1 =  4 marks. 
In this case candidate y would have won: 
𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑥,𝑢, 𝑣                      ≠ 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑢, 𝑣                      𝑆2 ≠  𝑆1 . 
4.1.1. Solution 
Let’s use DBV. 
First, let’s find the 𝐵𝑁𝜔 : 𝐵𝑥𝜔 ,𝐵𝑦𝜔 ,𝐵𝑧𝜔 ,𝐵𝑢𝜔 &𝐵𝑣𝜔  
We use  𝑆1 :𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑢, 𝑣                      to determine the entering order in the floors. Here, n=5. 
 
𝐵𝑥5 = 𝐵𝑥𝜔 = 𝐵𝑥0 × (𝑛 − 1)
5−1 = 54 × (5 − 1)4 = 13824 
𝐵𝑦4 = 𝐵𝑦𝜔 = 𝐵𝑦0 × (𝑛 − 1)
4−1 = 52 × (5 − 1)3 = 3328 
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𝐵𝑧3 = 𝐵𝑧𝜔 = 𝐵𝑧0 × (𝑛 − 1)
3−1 = 47 × (5 − 1)2 = 752 
𝐵𝑢2 = 𝐵𝑢𝜔 = 𝐵𝑢0 × (𝑛 − 1)
2−1 = 17 × (5 − 1)1 = 68 
𝐵𝑣1 = 𝐵𝑣𝜔 = 𝐵𝑣 × (𝑛 − 1)
1−1 = 0 × (5 − 1)0 = 0 
 
Now let’s derived the 𝐵 𝑁𝜔 : 𝐵 𝑥𝜔 ,𝐵 𝑦𝜔 ,𝐵 𝑧𝜔 ,𝐵 𝑢𝜔 &𝐵 𝑣𝜔  
There are as: 𝐵 𝑁𝜔 = 𝐵
 
𝑁 × 𝐵𝑁𝜔  
We already have the 𝐵 𝑁. They are Borda points of different alternatives in 𝑅2
𝑁 
 
𝐵 𝑥𝜔 = 𝐵
 
𝑥 × 𝐵𝑥𝜔 = 42 × 13824 = 580608 
𝐵 𝑦𝜔 = 𝐵
 
𝑦 × 𝐵𝑦𝜔 = 56 × 3328 = 186368 
𝐵 𝑧𝜔 = 𝐵
 
𝑧 × 𝐵𝑧𝜔 = 47 × 752 = 35344 
𝐵 𝑢𝜔 = 𝐵
 
𝑢 × 𝐵𝑢𝜔 = 21 × 68 = 1428 
𝐵 𝑣𝜔 = 𝐵
 
𝑣 × 𝐵𝑣𝜔 = 4 × 0 = 0 
 
Consequently, 
𝐵 𝑥𝜔 > 𝐵
 
𝑦𝜔 > 𝐵
 
𝑧𝜔 > 𝐵
 
𝑢𝜔 > 𝐵
 
𝑣𝜔𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧,𝑢, 𝑣                       in 𝑅2
𝑁 𝑆1 =  𝑆2 . Q.E.D. 
 
5. DBV and exogenous shock 
The gap between 𝐵𝑁𝜔  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵
 
𝑁𝜔 can pave the way to a new analysis of 
behavioural adjustment due to exogenous shocks. The aim here is to analyse the 
importance of the gap between these two vectors. The higher the distance, the 
greater the impact. 
Let consider the first example. The two vectors are:  
 
𝐵𝑁𝜔 = (𝐵𝑥𝜔 = 81,  𝐵𝑦𝜔 = 270,   𝐵𝑧𝜔 = 2 ,   𝐵𝑡𝜔 = 9) 
 → 𝐵_1 =  
270
81
9
2
  
𝐵 𝑁𝜔 =  𝐵
 
𝑥𝜔 = 810, 𝐵
 
𝑦𝜔 = 1620, 𝐵
 
𝑧𝜔 = 6,    𝐵
 
𝑡𝜔 = 36  
→ 𝐵_2 =  
1620
810
36
6
  
 
Graph 1. Alternatives's Shock gap. 
Source: Author 
 
This radar graph shows the gap between 𝑅1
𝑁(in blue) and 𝑅2
𝑁 (in brown). The 
graph shows alternatives y (which is represented by the red number 1) and x 
(which is represented by the red number 2) are most influenced by the shock. 
To capture the behaviours of individuals, let’s study elasticity.  
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The following regression3 shows that when there is no change in the profile 
preference of individuals, the slope tends to 1. The effect here is therefore 1-1 = 
0% as shown in Table-1. 
 
Table1. Level of slope when there is no change in alternative preferences.  
Source SS  MS Number of obs = 4 
  F( 1, 3)=.     
Model 10.5550426  10.5550426 Prob > F = . 
Residual 0  0 R-squared = 1.0000 
  Adj R-squared = 1.0000   
Total 10.5550426  2.63876066 Root MSE = 0 
LnB_1 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
LnB_1 1 . . . . . 
Notes: Formula in stata: regress LnB_1 LnB_1, noconstant. Source: Author from Stata. 
 
From Table-2, the effect from introducing change in alternatives, leads to a 
slope of 0.6869. Meaning that the impact is 1 - 0.6869 = 0.3131. The impact of the 
change in  𝑆1 , due to the change in 𝑅2
𝑁has a magnitude of 31 on a scale of 100. 
 
Table 2. Level of slope when there is a change in alternative preferences. 
Notes: Formula in stata: regress LnB_1 LnB_2, noconstant. Source: Author from Stata. 
 
The shock had therefore a 31% impact on the aggregated behaviour of 
individuals.  
Let us assume that we are in a stock market, the individual preferences are 
ordered according to their risk aversion ( 𝑅1
𝑁) . They therefore choose the 
composition of their portfolio according to their risk aversion. After an exogenous 
short-term shock (drastic decline in oil prices, bad economic conditions, etc.) 
Individuals decide to change(𝑅2
𝑁) the composition of their portfolios (increase their 
investments in some assets and reduce in others). 
The shock leading to (𝑅2
𝑁) has therefore an impact on individuals' risk aversion. 
The magnitude of that shock is 31 over the scale we’ve defined. This can be the 
market volatility or the market oversight. It has in this case, increased their 
aversion if y and x are risky assets (according to Graph. 1). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Finally, collective rationality in the aggregation of choices is sometimes 
difficult to establish. Arrow (1963) said that there was no voting rule that is not 
subject to bias. Thus, the impossibility theorem sets 4 conditions to be satisfied for 
any rational voting rule. The Borda rule respected 3 of them, but stumbled on the 
last one: Indifference of Irrelevant Alternatives. 
By redesigning the Borda rule's weight determination technique and making it 
dynamic, this paper allows the rule to respect the Arrow IIA. The new rule is called 
Dynamic Borda Voting (DBV). The DBV also makes it possible to deal with the 
problem of cloning manipulation.  
Calculations, propositions with proof and explanations are made to show the 
effectiveness of this method. From DBV, the paper presents a method to measure 
and quantify the magnitude of the shock due to change in irrelevant alternatives 
over a scale moving from 0 to 100. 
 
3 These statistical regressions are only illustrative. 
 SS  MS Number of obs = 4 
  F( 1, 3)= 178.43     
Model 10.3805151  10.3805151 Prob > F = 0.0009 
Residual .174527526  .058175842 R-squared = 0.9835 
  Adj R-squared = 0.9780   
Total 10.5550426  2.63876066 Root MSE = .2412 
LnB_1 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
LnB_2 .6869397 .0514257 13.36 0.001 .5232801 .8505994 
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